

Oil, State and Minority Rights in the Oil Producing Communities of Delta State, Nigeria

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Abstract: There is widespread agreement in both qualitative and quantitative social science researches that oil and wars are linked. Owing to the fact that Oil resource has become a critical element in the power capabilities of nations within the matrix of global political economy. This is evident in the perpetual contradiction of both exogenous and indigenous dimensions with which National oil have been surrounded. From the international point of view, it has become the major source of instability among nations; bearing in mind the popular Gulf War of 1996 and the 1st September, 2009. In addition there are series of domestic violence between the various internal interest groupings within the oil producing states especially between the central authorities on one hand and oil producing communities on the other. The main sources of these frictions more especially among those countries practicing federalism has been the question of revenue sharing formula especially the struggle over the control of the lion's share of the oil cake. The common trend among primary resource based nations especially oil including Nigeria is the continuous outcry for marginalization by the oil producing communities especially in the area of provision essential services and other basic needs. The attendant consequence of this is the agitation for Minority rights. This paper therefore examines how the Nigerian state responded to the agitation by the oil bearing communities in the Delta state Nigeria. The study combines both survey method and the use of available. Multiple approaches sufficient for both qualitative and quantitative data were adopted. For the data generated through survey method both descriptive and correlational statistical tools were used this include simple percentage for the secondary data, simple descriptive technique otherwise known as document analysis were used. The study reveals that oil has become central and sources of conflict in global political economy i.e. wars among countries and with oil producing communities. That the mismanagement of oil resources in Nigeria has resulted in poor state of development and increase in the propensity of poverty among Nigerians especially among oil producing communities in the Niger delta which resulted in agitation both convulsive and violent. This compelled the Nigeria state to respond through different measures including; Use of violence/threats of violence, legalistic approach, Institutional response and above all dived and rule. That the strategies adopted by the Nigerian state have yielded mixed effects both positive and negative across different communities. However of all these strategies the most outstanding is the institutional responses such as the establishment of Oil Minerals producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC), the Niger delta Development commission(NDDC), the creation of ministry of Niger delta and the introduction of Amnesty programme for the repentant militants including vocational training and payment of stipends, the paper recommends among other things: That the federal government through the Niger delta Development commission (NDDC) and the ministry of Niger delta should sustain the amnesty programme especially the vocational training aspect of it.

Key Words: Oil, State and Minority Rights

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I. Introduction

Oil resource has become a critical element in the power capabilities of nations within the matrix of global political economy. This is evident in the perpetual contradiction of both exogenous and indigenous dimensions with which National oil have been surrounded. From the international point of view, it has become the major source of instability among nations; bearing in mind the popular Gulf War of 1996 and the 1st September, 2009 when America invaded Iraq as an example. In addition there are series of domestic violence between the various internal interest groupings within the various oil producing states especially between the central authorities on the one hand and oil producing communities on the other. The main sources of these frictions resulting into

political instability more especially among those countries practicing federalism has been and will continue for relative long period of time the question of revenue sharing formula especially the struggle over the control of the lion's share of the oil cake.

The common trend among primary resource based nations especially oil including Nigeria is the continuous outcry for marginalization by the oil producing communities especially in the area of provision essential services and other basic needs without which life became meaningless and unbearable. The attendant consequence of this cry for marginalization by this oil producing communities is the agitation for Minority rights or resource control. It is apparent to acknowledge that at the Centre of conflict surrounding oil exploration and exploitation, is the Shell Petroleum Development Corporation, which is a clear manifestation of the contradiction inherent in the operation of global capitalism.

In Nigeria as in other nations practicing federalism, fiscal relationship between the Centre and the component units have always been phenomenal requiring both human scheming and political will to surmount these overbearing challenges. This situation is more pronounced among the emerging federal states like Nigeria where a combination of several factors constrained the operations of fiscal federalism or distributive justice as an all important element of inter-governmental fiscal policy.

The above situation is glaring manifestation of the fact that politics has taken the Centre stage of revenue allocation and the apparent popular perception of the central government growing financial hegemony in relations to its component units as a result of persistent manipulation of the revenue allocation formula. The resultant effect of this mindsets of the dominance of politics in the intergovernmental fiscal relations, especially in an oil dependent mono-centric and rentier economy like Nigeria is the growing feelings of being short changed on the side of the oil producing communities and the outright demand for absolute control of the natural resource found in their area, while they pay appropriate taxes to the central government for essential services as enshrined in what they called the "principle of true federalism".

The above scenario therefore presents the Nigerian state with the impracticable challenges of effective management of crisis associated with the imbalance between the mandate and the available resource at all levels of government, especially where oil is involved. Consequently, it is glaring that the Nigeria state had always view the oil producing communities with suspicions considering the fact that most of those that control the central government are not from the oil producing states (Irons, Gowon, Murtala, Obasanjo, Shagari, Babangida, Abdulsalami Obasanjo, Yar'adua Buhari). This imaginary threat to the central government by the oil bearing communities has further been aggravated by the adoption of the confrontational approach through the resurgence of many militia groups among the Niger delta communities. This has further consolidated the state's perception of these agitations as a separatist tendency which threatened the corporate existence of the Nigerian state.

The question therefore is how the Nigerian State responded to this growing wave of politics of oil and the agitation by the minority especially in the Niger delta. The answer to this sensitive question is what constitutes the focal point of this paper.

II. Objective of the Study

- i. Examine the nature of Nigerian state response to the Niger delta agitation for minority rights
- ii. Examine the effectiveness of these measures adopted by the state on the agitation for minority rights in the Niger delta communities of delta state

2.1.2 Politics of Oil, Instability and Development: Global Perspectives

There is widespread agreement in both qualitative and quantitative social science researches as well as in the minds of mass public that oil and wars are linked (Klador, 2007:2). This strong link between oil and wars is so evident in the growing scholarly consensus based on both qualitative and quantitative studies. This consensus notwithstanding, the association is so complex and often difficult to untangle through the use of qualitative work alone. One of the most extensive and in-depth interrogation on the above subject matter is rooted in the work of (Klador et al, 2007) who raises certain posers related to the issue of relationship between oil and war: to what extent does oil cause, exacerbate or mitigate conflict, and what are the specific mechanisms through which these occur? Does the possession of petroleum in conflict ridden countries change the nature of conflicts? If so, how?

Despite this scholarly consensus some scholars contend that the linkage between any natural resources and war are unusually strong hence, Klare coining the term resource war. However, of all these resources, oil and its byproducts occupy a strategic and outstanding place in global political economy. This has been widely acknowledged in oil narratives. As Klare later concluded:

Petroleum is unique among the world's resource....it has more potentials than any of the other resources to provoke major crisis and conflict in the years ahead (2006:xiii).

There are a lot of quantitative works that concur with this examination. Collier and Hoeffler work on economic causes of civil wars, and greed and grievances in civil war (2004) produced an intellectual evolution striking parallel to that found in qualitative works. While the existence of a pattern linking primary commodities in

general; oil, non-fuel minerals and agricultural goods to either the onset or duration of war is still disputed, evidence about the association between oil and war abounds in unambiguous term. Specifically, these narratives contend that dependence on oil for export is associated with conflict, citing violent life experience in oil-rich countries like Angola, Columbia, Iraq, Nigeria, Russia and Venezuela as examples. These for instance are shared in the conclusion of scholarly works of Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Desaysa 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; and Fearon 2004 all of whom demonstrated the rigous linkage between petroleum and conflict. As Fearon (2005:483) specifically pointed out “oil predicts civil war risks”.

To further demonstrate this linkage between oil and wars, (Klador, 2007) identified two types of wars, associated with oil: the old and the new wars. “Old wars” are wars between states or actors aspiring to state power where the aim is the military capture of territory and the decisive encounter is the battle between armed forces as evident in the first and second world Wars. These wars require states to mobilize their resources as never before resulting in the construction of different states and regimes in the defeated territory. New wars in contrast take place in the context of failing states where borders become increasingly irrelevant. They are fought by network of state and non-state actors where out and out battles are rare and violence is mainly directed against civilians or symbols of order characterized by new form of political economy involving a combination of extremists’ politics and criminality. He cited as examples the violence in Sudan, Somalia and Iraq.

(Klador, 2007) further argued that oil wars are renteer wars and whatever the motivation of the fighters and whatever religious, ethnic or other difference also drive conflict where oil is present tends to involve struggles for control over exceptional gains generated by this valuable resource. While historically this has always been the case, the change in the later part of twentieth century is the combination of actors, involved in rent-seeking behaviour. Specifically speaking, geo-political competition which characterized the old war is supplemented by struggle among various domestic actors that effectively parcel out or even dismantle the state itself, for example secessionist wars and by violent predatory behaviour on the part of the non-state foreign and local actors for direct access to oil rent in legal and illegal ways. Put in another language, rent-seeking in oil exporting countries has gradually filtered downwards throughout societies from the level of international competition, down to domestic competition at the state level and finally to competition among non-state actors at local level. When this occurs within the context of failing state, instead of providing arms and monies to the centralized government of the oil state to govern their people rent become linked with violence at every level making it especially difficult to re-establish authority through the controlled territory. This linkage between rent-seeking behaviour and violence is called rent-seeking circle.

Just like linkage between oil and war, several scholars of politics of oil have noted a circle in the behaviour of oil dependent state. This they explain largely in terms of price volatility. This is common especially among early scholars of classical economies. (Klador et al, 2007) while not disputing the influence of price volatility on the circle in the behaviour of the oil state argued that there are other variables. To demonstrate this, they adopted a historical combination of rent-seeking by different states and non-state actors both within oil dependent state and abroad at different terms that explain the circle. To consolidate this, they identified four phases of oil rent-seeking circle drawing inferences from oil-rich countries such as Nigeria, Indonesia, Saudi-Arabia and Iran, namely: state building, stabilization, prediction and state failure. Each of these phases is characterized by peculiar actors both state and non-state, types and sources of state revenues, nature of politics, forms of politics and types of conflict arisen thereof (Klador, 2007)

There are also other studies that viewed the relationship between oil and wars from different perspectives such as the resource curse theory, Dutch Disease perspectives, price volatility, factor endowment, statistic or institutionalist perspective as well as structural Marxist perspective. These oil narratives not only gave divergent views on the nature of relationship but also relationship between oil and economic development. The commonest stand point among the findings of these studies is that political instability in the form of civil unrest is more prevalent in environment characterized by resource abundance especially of mineral variety than those characterized by resources scarcity. Lowi (2009), in her classic study identified four internal and external factors as responsible for the resource curse theory to explain this developmental backwardness and prevalence of violence in a resource – rich nation especially oil producing states. These factors are: Dutch Disease, price volatility, factor endowment and mismanagement of “Rent”. To her, Dutch Disease tends to afflict economies with booming resources especially oil within the competitiveness of non-booming tradable sector. Similarly, primary products (oil, gold, diamond etc) are subject to greater price volatility in global market than manufactured goods and that in the absence of export diversification, price volatility can provoke growth collapse (Auty, 1998). In agreement, Grief et al (2002) seems to be rather suggestive on why resource-rich countries tend to be developmentally backward. According to him, Government less constrained by financial imperatives also feel less constrained in their treatment of taxpayers and these citizens once freed of their contracts with their rulers revert to perdition and conflict. In the opinion of Auty (1997), however, since resource – rich countries have a tolerance for conflict over rent than the resource- poor countries, in so far as rent offers a natural magnet for political competition, this fosters the emergence of functional states than promote sectional interests. Consolidating the

above, Auty and Gelb (2000) avers that resource abundance is more closely associated with predatory and benevolent – developmental state and the former is more associated with political instability than the later. In a similar vein, Collier and Hoeffler (2001) suggest rather that it is the opportunities for natural resource predation that predict conflict in resource rich environment.

However, Lowi (2009) though not disputing the above argues that there are very few and negligible efforts by scholars to explain political outcomes in resource abundant countries until recently. Even those that existed in the early period tended to be piggy-back on the explanation for economic outcomes. He further adds that many scholars in their narratives relied upon sector based analysis in their methodology (Karl, 1997; Shafer, 1994) or the rentier state framework (Yates, 1996). And in the process ventured explicitly in to the explanation of political instability ran into problem of establishing traces of causal relationship (Lowi, 2009). She does conclude that although there exist relationship between natural resources such as oil and instability, it is not only wealth that determines political outcome such as violence or instability rather the combination of local factors and the decision of leaders. To demonstrate this further, Lowi (2009) deployed two explanations for outcomes in resource – rich countries especially oil rich countries: economic and political explanations.

In her economic perspectives, Lowi acknowledged that most of the studies by neo-classical economies defend the resource curse hypothesis by locating the explanation for the relatively poor performance of the oil exporting countries in the peculiarities of booming sectors in general, and the Dutch-Disease syndrome in particular. This preposition was contextually used to describe the experience of Netherlands with whose large inflow of revenue from export of North Sea gas in 1970s. In a simple term, Dutch Disease refers to two effects that tend to follow resource boom: in order words it is a situation in which a particular country generates revenue in aggregated term from its export but majority of its citizenry suffer in penury. The first of the two effects mentioned above therefore is the appreciation of the real exchange rate due to sharp increase in rent; the second is the tendency of a booming resource sectors to draw capital and labour away from manufacturing agricultural sector thus squeezing production in these sectors by raising their production costs (Lowi, 2009). The implication of these combined effects is sharp reduction in agriculture and manufactured goods and increase in both imported items and production, and cost of non-tradable such as physical infrastructure and social capital. The above scenario is similar to the experience of Nigeria during the oil boom of the 1970s when agricultural production and manufacturing sectors were abandoned in preference to the lucrative oil sector which provides both the state and individual elites with rent from oil export. The rent provided by the new oil wealth results in ostentations life style with Nigerian elites spending millions on the construction of mansions at home and abroad and fleets of exotic cars often obtained and maintained by the embezzled state funds.

Factor Responsible for Agitation for Minority rights in Niger Delta

There is growing scholarly interest on agitation for Minority rights in Nigeria, particularly the most disturbing activities of the militants in the oil rich Niger-Delta area. This result in various interpretation and perception about the origin, nature as well as implication of the politics of oil and agitation for the Minority rights in the region on national development. The fundamental problem with most of the reviews is not only the dearth of literature on the topic but also the fact that only few had attempted to examine the relationship between the oil, minority agitation in the Niger Delta and national development as much of the review focus on the origin and justification for the minority agitation or otherwise. This explains why this research is paramount because its findings are expected to bridge the gap between the existing literature and the realities of national development. Although some literature blame the multinational oil corporations for the stagnation and development misfortune experienced in the post-colonial Nigeria state (Mier, 2000; Tunner, 1985; Anyakimee, 2000; Ojo, 2006; Nwako, 2000, and Jike, 1987), a study by Omeje (2005) exonerates the transnational corporations from the total blame for economic decline in Nigeria. According to Omeje (2005:332):

It has been the state interest in rent and patrimonial accumulation that primarily defines the context of Nigeria's politics of oil and policies: the interest of Trans-National Oil Corporations (TNOC) as significant as they seem are secondary even if the rents generated are the life blood of the state.

Put it in another language, Dlakwa (2006:62) observes that the presence of trans national oil companies alone would not have resulted into the poor performance of the economy rather it was the failure of the state government to utilize properly the revenue that accrue from the oil tax, rent and royalties to promote sustainable development programmes including the diversification of the economy that is primarily responsible for economic decline hence the fierce agitation for Minority rights which became manifest in the struggle for resource control.

Obi (1998) sees the political economy of politics of oil and agitation for Minority rights in the Niger Delta as part of power game between the dominant groups in the existing power matrix. He submitted that in this game plan, all the dominant groups seek to expand their riches, each trying to outdo the other in the belief that it would be or it is being subjected and marginalized or schemed out by others in the sharing of the national cake. Therefore, power relationship in Nigeria has thus been patterned along patron-client setting in which the grand patron is the Federal Government by virtue of its control over the lion share of the oil revenue and the State and

Local Government Authorities as their client. The oil bearing states of the Niger-Delta are thus bent on tilting the equation by gaining control over the oil resources, and possibly become the patron to the Federal Government and non-oil bearing states.

Mier (2000) further link the agitation by Niger-Delta minorities with the perpetual neglect suffered by the oil producing communities from the independent government of Nigeria, in collaboration with the multinational oil companies operating in the area. This is because the people of the Niger Delta saw the immense wealth which the oil represents but only scarce and negligible public goods such as education and health facilities were provided in return while their Environment remained polluted. The fundamental weakness of this view is its inability to see the problematic of development as a general phenomenon that is lacking in

Virtually, all the state of Nigeria to treat Niger Delta as the only region that needs the attention of government in the national development drives whereas there are some states in the other parts of Nigeria whose developmental profile is worse than the coastal states of the Niger Delta.

Kyari (2009) linked the Niger-Delta politics of oil and the under development of the contemporary Nigeria state, with what he called the well-known legendary survivability of the Nigeria elites and the very phenomenon called the state in political science, which have seen to it that in one form or the other, things go on and on as they are. The state endures, and the elite survive. The elite engage in the mere brinkmanship dragging the state to a cliff-edge, but always managing to come back again, it's only the masses who suffer or even perish as when these ups or pestilence attack occurs which are both common and repetitive in Nigeria.

He further laments that although such features are prevalent in Africa the Nigeria case is more severe despite the country's vast human and natural resources. In this respect therefore, one cannot but concluded that the Nigerian elite whose duty and responsibility it is to enable the country realize its manifest destiny have betrayed its responsibility and effectively rendered Nigeria aspirations for development, unity and sustainability into "mere clichés", being worshiped not because of their essence but because "of their propaganda power". This explains why Nigeria remained a toddler after almost fifty years of her independence (Kyari, 2009). These realities no doubt created a feeling of discontentment among the various constituent units of the federation; it engenders loss of confidence in the survivability of Nigeria amidst tension and crisis such as the Niger-Delta militancy and recently the Boko Haram insurgency in some part of northern Nigeria.

A study by Nkom (1994:430) reveals that two main forces seem to have been responsible for the current spate of ethnic and cultural identity politics manifesting themselves in the national question. For one, there is the growing clamor for self-determination on the part of the cultural groups. For instance, minority groups all over the country have been demanding that they be known, located differently, and allowed greater participation in national political life. Secondly, there is the issue of greater participation in decision making at all levels of governance. He further argued that many communities, ethnic or sub-nationalities feel marginalized in the scheme of things and so want some autonomy in a form of resource control within which they can forge their national identity in a national development set up. Thus the Niger -Delta minorities realized that agitation for Minority rights is the convenient conveyor belt under which they could push their demand to the attention of the state. Dumoye (2003) argued that:

The momentum for Minority rights and resources control by Governors in the Niger-Delta areas increased during the Fourth Republic because of several reasons ranging from the injustice and inequality that characterized the distribution of national resources, particularly the oil revenue, the issue of derivation as a fundamental principles of revenue allocation, poor infrastructure in Nigeria especially in the Niger-Delta, democratization which has made people to freely express themselves, the retaliatory measures taken by Southern states in response to the introduction of Sharia in some northern states.

He equally identified systematic destruction on the ecosystem in the oil producing states/areas which led to environmental degradation, pollution, acid rain, unemployment and poverty as well as failure of the multinational oil companies to contribute to the socio-economic development of the oil producing states, activities of the unemployed youths, and resources control used as a vote catching ploy by politicians during general elections.

According to Oladeji (2006:289) the advent of democratic institution in Nigeria following the prolonged period of military rule has made the issue of politics of oil particularly the issue of Minority rights assume a critical position in the Nigeria fiscal federalism. This is because the minority agitation for resource control appears like a sectional strategy not only to curb the assumed established central government growing financial hegemony but also as a mechanism to bail out component units particularly the oil producing states of the Niger-Delta from their financial woes and development debacles. The crux of the view put by Oladeji is that the agitation for Minority rights in Niger-Delta is seen as the southern Nigeria's alternative to break away from the inter-tier financial dependence jinx and possible solution to states economic stagnation and lack of development in general.

In the word of Obi (1999) the concentration of the right and power to distribute land and collect compensation in the hand of the state governors have made the people of the Niger-Delta to feel short changed while the avenue for seeking redress remain virtually nonexistent. Recounting on the nature of grievances of the oil producing state Oladeji (2006) argued that apart from the whittling down of the derivation principles from at

least 50% in the first republic to about 1% in 1992, the practice that assign 40% and 30% respectively to equity and population implies that 70% of the revenue in Nigeria is distributed without consideration to the origin. This development according to him present important sources of tension as people in the oil producing states have continued to insist on compensation for environmental degradation they perpetually suffered.

In another view Aghalino (2003:301) linked the political economy of the agitation for Minority rights in the Niger-Delta area to the issue of land crisis and obnoxious land laws inherited by the Nigeria state from the colonial government. This in his view is attributed to the fact that in the Niger-Delta, land issue is a festering sore in the tripartite relationship among government, oil producing communities and the oil producing firms. This agitation was made more intense by the confirmation of the power to revoke and allocate land, in addition to the payment of compensation to the various state governors rather than the land owners by the land use Acts. This development according to him had produced backlash consequences resulting in the escalation of grievances of the Niger-Delta minorities against the Nigerian state. Hence, the agitation for Minority rights and resources control.

Another common trend in most literature on the Niger-Delta is the division of the scholars along the North South divide with much of the scholars in individual and collective capacity perpetually amplifying the justification for or otherwise of the resources control agenda depending on Authors area of extraction or origin. For instance, there is common tendency among scholars of south-south extraction to shift the blame for their plight and general development backwardness of the area on the hegemonic power of the northern Nigerian power elites who dominated the political power matrix of the Nigerian state since independence thereby giving the north a leverage in the access to national cake predominantly baked from the National wealth of the Niger-Delta. It is in response to these allegations that another line of thinking from the northern axis emerged and consistently debunked the issue of the claim over the petroleum resources by the Niger-Delta minorities, the loudest voice among which are Bala and Omorunyi.

Bala (2004) has extensively resorted to historical and geological process analysis in order to dismiss the agitation for resource control in the Niger-Delta. This he successfully achieved by deploying two lines of argument, first according by the virtue of the British colonial conquest the Niger-Delta has lost its right over its resources to the British conquerors a right which was at independence transferred to the Nigerian state and not a region. He further argued that the oil located in the Niger-Delta is the result of the geological process that took place in the upper ridges of the Niger and Benue rivers. As such it is the people up country that should actually lay claim to the oil and not the Niger-Delta.

Corroborating Bala's (2004) first line of thinking Omorunyi (2004) argued that under the rule of international succession in international law, it is the Nigerian state and not the regions that become the successor to the ownership of what the crown or British government had in Nigeria after 1st October, 1960. This legalistic approach is too technical for empirical studies of this nature although it has strategic place in terms of contribution to the exiting literature.

On the geological process approach adopted by Bala in explaining what lead to the formation of Niger-Delta and oil, Edevbie (2006) argued that this ignores the value of a suitable geological environment for the compression of accumulated solid minerals under pressure and temperature to produce petroleum. He dismissed the view as simplistic analysis of a complex issue in which a serious and rigorous academic pursuit gives room for sentiments and selective amnesia. He maintained therefore, that the places that have petroleum resources are the areas that have the proper hydrological structure to generate them. This in his view explains why all rivers do not form delta and only a number of deltas have petroleum resources (<http://www.wardo.org/resourcecontrol>). Aghalino (2006:301) in contradistinction opines that the implication of the view point put forward by Bala and Omorunyi is that the Nigerian state inherited such obnoxious laws that made the Niger-Delta a victim of internal colonialism. He gave an example of the Mineral Proclamation Ordinance of 1966 (5.3) which states that the entire property and control of mineral and mineral oil under or upon any land in Nigeria and of all rivers, streams and water courses throughout Nigeria is and shall be on the Crown. He lamented further that although the mineral proclamation was repelled and replaced with mineral Act the content remained the same.

Aghalino (2006:310) further argued that the theory as demonstrated by Edevbie was formulated to encourage the northerners to intensify the belief that they are the primary owners of the Nigerian oil. According to him, oil can be found in various areas of different hydrological variation from deep sea of the North Sea, to the desert area of Saudi Arabia and in dry regions of Texas in the United States of America. He dismissed the position therefore as a pseudo theory whose ultimate goal is to influence policy on the distribution of oil revenue.

From the preceding arguments, it is clear that the main claim by the protagonists of resource control agenda is the feeling that while they produce most of the resources with which the other parts of Nigeria who contribute little or nothing to the development of the nation are being developed, the coastal state of the Niger-Delta receive little in return and singularly borne the brunt of the mineral exploration and exploitation. The fundamental loopholes in the claims is the false assumption that the other parts of the country, particularly the north, is enjoying the proceeds of the oil wealth at the expense of the coastal states who suffer in form of

environmental degradation and pollution of their eco-system. The reality of the issue however, is that while it is true that the oil bearing state of the Niger-Delta did not receive adequate compensation for the damage done to their farmlands and environment, poverty and under-development is a common coefficient shared by the Nigeria contemporary post-colonial state from the coastal states of the Niger-Delta stretching to the deserts states in the northern Nigeria.

This line of thinking however is not sufficient as both the state and the local government areas in the Niger-Delta have not accounted or justified the enormous resources they received from the federal government in form of 13% derivation and compensation. This is because majority of the development projects executed in the region is not done by the governors of their various states but by the federal government, Niger-Delta Development Commission or come as a corporate social responsibility by the multinational oil corporation operating in the region. It is in support of the above position that Amuta (2001) criticized the governors of the south-south states in their struggle for Minority rights and resource control. He argued that agitation for Minority rights and resources control is the tale of resurgence and decadent tribalism, since in real sense there exists already some form of resource control in some states where the loudest voice about it is being made as the vast resources of these states are already under the control of the governors.

2.2.2 Greed Fuelling Conflict Theory

Although there exists quantum of theories relevant and adequate for explaining the relationship between state, oil and agitation for minority rights this particular paper is based on the greed fuelling conflict theory. This approach is rooted in the rent seeking behaviour perspective of the political economy school of thought. The proponent argues that economic motivations are driving force of contemporary conflict (Klador 2007). According to them in conflicts where the rule of law and taxation systems have collapsed, source of income consist of war related activities, loot pillages, taxation of humanitarian aid, unfair terms of trade or illegal trading in valuable commodities like oil or drugs. In contrast to the geo-political theorist who are primarily concerned with the international war and the motivation of those great wars? The political economy school of thought primarily place emphasis on civil wars and the primary greed for both private greed and of both state and non-state actors. Therefore in precise terms while the geo-political theorist sees oil as a strategic commodity for the nation as a whole. The greed theorist is more concerned with private profit and source of finance for the belligerents in civil war with particular emphasis on insurgents.

The greed argument applies to both motivation and to opportunity. According to them access to oil revenues may be a motive for initiating or continuing as well as opportunity to finance military activities.

According to Collier and Hoeffler (2001) rebel organization with genuine grievances can raise funds through extortion of commodity export as a way of financing their struggles or grievances, but the extortion of primary commodity exports will also occur where it is profitable (greed) and the organization which perpetuates this extortion will need to take form of a rebellion.

This they captured succinctly:

We propose that the endowment of unskilled labour and guns which characterized rebel organizations is particularly suited to raise funds through the extortion of export, our proposition can be interpreted in two ways on the universal grievance and interpretation, rebellions need to finance themselves and the extortion of primary commodity exports offers the best opportunity for financial viability. In the limit, only where there are such opportunities can rebel organization escalate to the scale need for civil war. On the literal greed interpretation, the extortion of primary commodity exports will occur where it is profitable and the organization, which perpetuate this extortion will need to take the form of rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler 2001:13).

According to Collier and Hoefflers statistics the tendency for insurgences to occur are most likely when primary commodities comprise approximately one third of a state's Gross Domestic products whereas where it is above that level the government of such state can use their economic rent to suppress rebellion. However anything below that level is considered as insufficient revenue to finance the belligerents. The greed argument is applicable to all form of primary commodity.

However, there is new trend in oil narrative where some theorist do distinguish between types of primary commodities and argued that the specific characteristics of particular commodities have a greater effects on the shape of conflict as well as the character of the belligerents. One scholar that immensely distinguished himself in this respect is Le Billion who contends that primary commodities can be described either as 'point or proximate' and as 'proximate or distant' depending on the resource spatial spread or mode of exploitation, while the proximate distant distinctions refers to the distance from the government. Oil is a point resource, whose exploitation involves concentrated capital intensive with few linkages to the other sectors of the economy. However, in exceptional situation where oil is close to the government or easily controlled by government usually offshore as in the case of Angola the typical form of violence is coup d'état to control government. Whereas oil fields are distant the typical form of conflict is secessionist thus Le Billion conclude that:

Resources can serve to shape the conflict taking place, the territorial control objectives, the duration and intensity of the conflict, and relations between belligerents and populations. Resources can also affect the internal cohesion of armed movement and motivate collusion between Adversaries, especially when exploiting or trading require such leadership. (Le Billion 2005:48).

Klador et al (2007) have come up with abundant evidence to support the greed argument in their cross country survey of sex countries. They cited example with experiences in Chechnya, Indonesia and Nigeria. In Chechnya for instance where bootlegged oil is a key source of income along with loot pillage and hostage taking. Chechen fighters sell oil extracted from back yard oil wells to the Russian forces who sales it on to the Russian market similarly in Colombia the FLN bombed pipelines and forced the oil companies to introduce social programmes, thereby gaining a ‘Robin Hood’ image, while the FARL gained access to oil through controlling municipalities, Right wing para-military where paid to offer protection by BP, a similar pattern take place in Aceh, Indonesia and in the Niger Delta.

The effort of the greed argument in explaining how conflicts are financed and why well financed conflicts are especially difficult to end are commendable. Its fundamental weakness is inherent in its in ability to offer satisfactory explanation of the complex causation of contemporary conflicts in the first place. In addition greed arguments have failed in analysis of the changing character of the state in the context of oil dependence and how this create extensive grievances that feed into explanations based on greed and .

III. MATERIALS AND METHODS

The study combines both survey method and the use of available document. The Study utilize both primary and secondary source of data. The primary data were generated using survey instrument specifically questionnaire. The secondary data on the other hand were generated through library documentation analysis. The population for this study consisted of stakeholders from Delta State.

Since it’s practically impossible to collect data from all the respondents in, Delta, Five (5) Local government areas were selected respectively .In each of these Local Government, 40 respondents were selected which cut across community leaders, Youth, Oil workers, NGO/CBO officials and other individual respondent which made up a total of two hundred (200) respondent all together. The study adopted purposive and judgmental sampling technique the justification for the adoption of this technique is due to the fact that there is no sample frame for all the targeted respondents and sensitive nature of the study.

Since the study is a combination of both survey Research and Library base documentation, multiple approaches sufficient for both qualitative and quantitative data were adopted. For the data generated through survey method both descriptive and correlational statistical tools were used this include simple percentage for the secondary data, simple descriptive technique otherwise known as document analysis were used.

Below is the Table representation

L.G.A	No. of Resp.
Antioch South	40
Warri south	40
Sample	40
Iosco north	40
Urine	40
Total	200

Source; survey 2015

IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NIGERIA STATE RESPONSE TO THE NIGER-DELTA INSTABILITY IN DELTA STATE

In this section the focus of the study is on the same issue. However this particular one focus on the fifteen (15) sampled communities in five selected Local Government Area of Delta State: Aniocha South, Warri South, SapeleIsoko North and Urwie, Local Government Areas.

5.1c: Effectiveness of violence/threats of violence on the Niger – Delta Instability in Delta State

		Very Effective		Effective		No response		Bad		Worse		Total	%
		No of rep	%	No of rep	%	No of rep	%	No of rep	%	No of rep	%		
1	OgwashiUku	-	-	2	16.7	-	-	7	58.3	3	25	12	100

2	Adonte	-	-	2	22.2	-	-	6	66.7	1	11.1	9	100
3	Ewalu	-	-	2	25	2	25	4	50	-	-	8	100
	Warri South												
4	Wari HQ	-	-	2	14.3	-	-	9	64.3	3	21.4	14	100
5	Obodo	-	-	3	27.3	-	-	6	54.5	3	27.3	11	100
6	Gbene-Matu	-	-	2	16.7	-	-	8	66.7	2	16.7	12	100
	Sapele												
7	Sapele HQ	-	-	3	23.1	2	15.4	6	46.3	2	15.4	13	100
8	Amukpe	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	88.9	1	11.1	9	100
9	Eleme	-	-	2	20	-	-	5	50	3	30	10	100
	Isoko-North												
10	Ozoro HQ	-	-	2	16.7	-	-	7	58.3	3	25	12	100
11	Ofagbe	-	-	1	11.1	3	33.3	5	55.6	-	-	9	100
12	Ellu	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	75	2	25	8	100
	Urwie												
13	Effurun HQ	-	-	2	14.3	-	-	8	57.1	4	28.6	14	100
14	Ekpan	-	-	2	25	-	-	5	62.5	1	12.5	8	100
15	Jeddo	-	-	2	25	-	-	6	75	-	-	8	100
	Total											158	

Source: Field Survey, 2015

In table 5.1c the task of respondents is to examine the effectiveness or otherwise of the instrument of violence/threat of violence as one of the strategies adopted by the Nigerian State in search of solution to the lingering crisis in the oil producing communities of the Niger-Delta area in Delta State.

The result revealed that the use of violence/threats of violence by the Nigerian State was not effective in whittling down the tempo of the agitation for Minority rights in Aniocha South Local Government Area. To particularly demonstrate this, 58.3% of the total respondents in OgwashiUku community in Aniocha South Local Government Area, uphold the view that the strategy was ineffective. 25% maintained that the strategy was even worse in terms of effectiveness. However only 16.7% remaining of the respondents saw the use of violence or threat of violence as an effective strategy in OgwashiUku community. This signifies that the instrument of violence or threat of violence did not work in the community.

Similarly, in Adonte community of the same Local Government Area majority of the respondents have supported the view that the use of violence/threats of violence was not successful in the community. To demonstrate this only 22.2% of the total respondents claimed that the strategy was effective. However the remaining 66.7% and 11.1% which constituted the majority of the respondents saw the approach as bad and worse respectively in terms of effectiveness. On this note it is discernable that the strategy was not a success story. Like the outcome in OgwashiUku and Adonte communities, the result from Ewalu community of the same Aniocha South Local Government Area of delta State was not different as only 25% of the respondents believe that the approach was effective. 50% examine the approach as ineffective, whereas the remaining 25% did not respond on the issue. In sum, it could be right to conclude that the adoption of violence/threats of violence by the Nigerian State as a strategy to end the agitation for Minority rights in the Niger-Delta communities of Aniocha South Local Government Area was not successful.

The outcome in Warri South Local Government Area on the ineffectiveness of the use of violence/threat of violence by the Nigerian State is overwhelming as demonstrated by majority of the respondents in all the three selected communities. In Warri headquarter, only 14.3% of the total respondents hold the view that the approach was effective. However, the remaining 85.7% said it was not effective. In Obodo community in the same Warri South Local Government Area, 54.5% and 27.3% of the total respondents uphold the view that the strategy was bad and worse in terms of effectiveness respectively. Only 27.3%, however, said the outcome was effective. This signifies failure of the use of violence/threats of violence in Obodo community of Warri South Local Government Area.

The situation in Gbene-matu community revealed similar but slightly different result as 66.7% of the respondents rated the strategy as bad, 16.7% hold that it was even worse in terms of effectiveness, however the remaining 16.7% maintained that the strategy was effective, indicating lack of effectiveness of the approach on the community. Inferences from the above scenario indicated that the use of violence/threat of violence as demonstrated by the Nigerian State did not have much effect on the protesting oil producing minorities in Warri South Local Government Area of Delta State.

Examining the situation in Sapele Local Government Area, The result was clear that the strategy did not work effectively as expected by the Nigeria State. To demonstrate this, majority of the respondents in the selected communities have supported this view. Specifically in Sapele community, 23.1% of the respondent holds the view that the strategy was effective. 15.4% remain silent on the issue. However those who saw the approach as bad constitute 46.2%, whereas the remaining 15.4% believe that the approach was even worse in terms of effectiveness. This implies the failure of the strategy in Sapele community. Similarly, all the respondents in

Amukpe community confirm that the strategy was inactive as 88.9% of the respondents viewed the approach as bad, whereas the remaining 11.1% maintained that it was even worse terms of ineffectiveness.

In Eleme community of the same Sapele Local Government Area it was clear that only 20% of the respondents believe that the choice of violence/threat of violence was effective measure. However, 50% of the respondent saw such measure as bad, whereas the remaining 30% affirms that it was even worse in effects. In summary the use of violence/threat of violence by the Nigerian State was unproductive in Sapele Local Government Area.

Looking at the situation in Isoko North Local Government Area, the result indicated that the use of violence/threats of violence did not work in these communities. In Ozoro headquarter for instance only 16.7% of the total respondents is of the view that the strategy was effective. However, 58.3% said it was bad, whereas the remaining 25% maintains that it was even worse when it come to the issue of effectiveness of strategy. The conclusion here is that the use of violence was not effective in Ozoro community. In the community of Ofagbe in the same Isoko North Local Government Area, the result was not much different as 55.6% of the respondents which constitute the majority are of the views that the approach was bad and ineffective. Only 11.1% saw the approach as an effective strategy. However the remaining 33.3% did not respond on the issue. It is clear therefore, that the choice of violence/threats of violence did not work in Ofagbe community of Isoko North Local Government Area.

The outcome in Ellu community in the same Isoko Local Government Area, indicate that all the respondents (100%) are of the view that the use of violence/threat of violence did not yielded the desired goal to the Nigerian State as 75% of the respondent rated the strategy as bad, while the remaining 25% saw it even as worse in the area of effectiveness. In aggregate term the use of violence/threats of violence by the Nigerian State to whittle down the agitation for Minority rights was in effective in Isoko North Local Government Area.

The table further presents the result in Urwie Local Government Area of Delta State where the outcome shows that the strategy of violence/threats of violence did not work effectively in the area. This was demonstrated by majority of the respondents. For instance in Effurun community which is the headquarters of the Local Government Area, only 14.3% of the respondents said the approach was effective against the remaining 57.1% and 28.6% who saw the use of violence/threats of violence as bad and worse respectively. This implies that the strategy did not work in the Effurun community.

In the same vein the survey in Ekpan community was not much different as 62.5% and 12.5% which is the majority, opines that the choice of violence/threats of violence was bad and worse respectively, against the remaining 25% that saw the strategy as effective impliedly the approach did not work in Ekpan community of Urwie Local Government Area.

Similarly, in Jeddo community 25% of the respondents saw the approach as an effective strategy, while the majority with 75% believes that the choice of violence/threat of violence did not wok effective in Jeddo community. In summary the choice of violence/threats of violence in Urwie Local Government Area of Delta State was not effective. From the forgoing analysis it became clear that the use of violence/threats of violence by the Nigerian State as a strategy to whittle down the agitation for Minority rights in the Niger-Delta communities of Delta State did not yield the desired goal as demonstrated by majority of the respondents across the state.

5.2c: Effectiveness of the Institutional Approach as the Nigerian State response to Niger- Delta Instability in Delta State

	Aniocha South	Very Effective		Effective		No response		Bad		Worse		Total	%
		No of rep	%	No of rep	%	No of rep	%	No of rep	%	No of rep	%		
1	OgwashiUku	3	25	6	50	2	16.7	1	8.3	-	-	12	100
2	Adonte	-	-	5	55.6	1	11.1	3	33.3	-	-	9	100
3	Ewalu	-	-	4	50	2	50	2	25	-	-	8	100
Warri South													
4	Wari HQ	-	-	8	57.1	3	21.4	1	7.1	2	14.3	14	100
5	Obodo	-	-	2	18.2	-	-	9	81.1	-	-	11	100
6	Gbene-Matu	2	16.7	7	58.3	2	16.7	3	25	-	-	12	100
Sapele													
7	Sapele HQ	2	15.4	7	53.8	2	15.4	3	23.1	0	0	13	100
8	Amukpe	2	22.2	5	55.6	-	-	2	22.2	-	-	9	100
9	Eleme	-	-	6	60	2	20	1	10	1	10	10	100
Isoko-North													
10	Ozoro HQ	-	-	10	83.3	-	-	0	0	2	16.7	12	100
11	Ofagbe	-	-	3	33.3	-	-	6	66.7	-	-	9	100
12	Ellu	-	-	4	50	2	25	2	25	-	-	8	100
Urwie													
13	Effurun HQ	-	-	7	50	2	14.3	3	21.4	2	14.3	14	100
14	Ekpan	1	12.5	5	62.5	-	-	-	-	2	25	8	100

15	Jeddo	-	-	-	-	1	12.5	5	62.5	2	25	8	100
	Total											158	

Source: Field Survey, 2015

The main objective of table 5.2c is to examine the effectiveness of the institutional approach as strategy adopted by the Nigerian State in response to the agitation for Minority rights in the Niger – Delta communities in Delta State. The table revealed that In Aniocha South Local Government Area the use of institutional approach was effective. This was confirmed by the majority of respondents in the communities selected across the Local Government Area.

In OgwashiUku community of Aniocha South Local Government Area, 50% of the respondents believe that the approach was effective, 25% hold the view that the strategy was even very effective. However, only 8.3% of the respondents said the approach was bad, the remaining 16.7% did not respond on the issue. This implies that the use of institutional approach was successful in OgwashiUku community in Aniocha South Local Government Area of Delta State.

Similarly the result was not much different in Adonte community as 55.6% of the respondents indicate that the use of institutional approach was effective, where as 33.3% examine the approach as bad, While the remaining 11.1% did not respond on the issue. On this note it is clear that the strategy was effective in Adonte community. Looking the issue of institutional approach in Ewalu community, the table revealed that only 25% of the total respondents saw the approach as bad and in effective. However 50% rated it as effective. While the remaining 25% did not respond on the issue, signifying that the use of institutional approach was successful in Ewalu community. In sum it is clear that the use of institutional approach by the Nigerian State as a solution to the Niger-Delta instability was successful in all the communities selected in Aniocha South Local Government Area of Delta State.

The next Local Government Area is the Warri South Local Government Area, where the outcome of the survey shows mixed result as the use of institutional was effective in two communities but not effective in the other community. This was demonstrated by majority of respondents across the selected communities in Warri community 57.1% of the respondents affirm that the choice of institutional approach yielded success story in the community. Only 7.1% and 14.3% saw the choice of the strategy as bad and worse respectively, while the remaining 21.4% remain silent on the issue. In Obodo community of the same Warri South Local Government Area, however the result was different as only 18.2% of the total respondents believe that the institutional approach was effective, against 81.1% of the respondents which constituted the majority who hold the view that the strategy was indeed bad and in effective in the community. This signifies that the choice of institutional measure was not effective in Obodo community.

The result in Gbene-Matu community was successful as 58.3% and 15.4% saw the measure as effective and very effective respectively, where as 25% of the respondent hold the view that it was bad, while the remaining 16.7% did not respond on the issue. This implies that the use of institutional approach had led to significant success in Gbene-matu community of Warri South Local Government Area of Delta State. On this note it is concluded that the adoption of institutional measure as a response to the agitation for Minority rights in the Niger – Delta communities of Warri South led to a mixed result as it proved to be effective in Warri and Gbene-matu communities, but ineffective in Obodo community in the same Warri South Local Government Area.

The outcome of the survey in Sapele Local Government has recorded a huge success as majority of respondents across all the three sampled communities have confirmed this. In specific term, the result in Sapele community shows that 53.8% of the respondents hold the view that the use of institutional measure was effective. 15.4% maintained that the measure was very effective, only 23.1% opines that the approach was bad, while the remaining 15.4% remain silent on the issue. The conclusion derived from this analysis is that the use of institutional measure by the Nigerian State in Sapele community was successful to a large extent. Furthermore the result in Amukpe community in the same Sapele Local Government Area was similar to that of Sapele community. This was demonstrated by majority of respondents in the community as 55.6% and 22.2% of the respondents viewed the use of the institutional measure as effective and very effective respectively; whereas the remaining 22.2% affirms that the approach was ineffective. Based on the majority decision rule it is clear that the use of institutional measure by the Nigerian State in Amukpe community was a large success.

Similarly, 60% of the total respondents hold the view that the use of institutional approach in Eleme community was effective. 20% did not respond on the issue, where as 10% each was of the view that the measure was bad and worse respectively. The overall result in Sapele Local Government Area indicates that the use of institutional approach was successful as confirmed by majority of the respondents in the communities across the Local Government.

In Isoko North Local Government Area the outcome was disaggregated as two out of the three communities sampled, Ozoro and Ellu communities are of the view that the institutional measure was effective in their respective communities while the result in Ofagbe community to the contrary as majority of the respondents supported this. For instance in Ozoro headquarters 83.3% of the respondents maintains that the institutional

approach was effective, where as 16.7% affirms that the approach was even worse and ineffective. This signifies that the use of institutional approach as a measure to whittle down the tempo of the agitation for Minority rights in the Niger-Delta community was effective, In Ozorocommunity of Isoko North Local Government Area.

The result in Ofagbe community in the same Local Government Area was however, different as only 33.3% of the respondents saw the measure as effective, where as 66.7% of the respondents which constituted the majority maintained that the institutional measure was ineffective. The implication of this finding is that the choice of institutional measure by the Nigerian State was a failure in Ofagbe community. In a contra-distinction, the result in Ellu community revealed that 50% of the respondents supported the view that the measure was effective. However 25% said it was ineffective, while the remaining 25% remain silent. This implies that the choice of institutional measure in Ellu was huge success. On a general note the conclusion from Isoko North Local Government was that the use of institutional measure was successful. In Urwie Local Government Area, the result was mixed as some communities supported the use of the institutional measure, whereas others were against it. For instance in Effurun community 50% of the total respondents said that the measure was effective, 21.7% believe that it was bad, while 14.3% said it was even worse. The remaining 14.3% however remain silent on the issue. This implies that the use the institutional measure was effective.

In Ekpan community of the same Local Government Area, only 25% of the respondents maintain that measure was bad and ineffective. However 62.5% and 12.5% affirms that measure was effective and very effective respectively. In essence the use of institutional measure by the Nigerian State in response to the Niger-Delta instability was a huge success in Ekpan community of Urwie Local Government Area of Delta State.

However, the result of the survey in Jeddo community in the same Local Government revealed that it was not successful. This was confirmed by 62.5% of the respondent who examine the measure as bad, 25% maintained that it was even worse, whereas the remaining 12.5% of the respondents did not respond on the issue. From the above analysis it is clear that the adoption of institutional approach by the Nigerian State was effective in Effurun and Ekpan communities, whereas the outcome was ineffective in Jeddo community.

5:3: Effectiveness of the Legal/Institutional Approach as Nigerian State response to Niger- Delta Instability in Delta State

	Aniocha South	Very Effective		Effective		No response		Bad		Worse		Total	%
		No of rep	%	No of rep	%	No of rep	%	No of rep	%	No of rep	%		
1	OgwashiUku	-	-	1	8.3	-	-	9	75	2	16.7	12	100
2	Adonte	-	-	2	22.2	-	-	4	44.4	3	33.3	9	100
3	Ewalu	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	62.5	3	37.5	8	100
	Warri South												
4	Wari HQ	-	-	4	28.6	-	-	8	57.1	2	14.3	14	100
5	Obodo	-	-	3	27.3	-	-	6	54.5	2	18.2	11	100
6	Gbene-Matu	-	-	6	50	-	2	4	33.3	0	0	12	100
	Sapele												
7	Sapele HQ	-	-	3	25	-	-	8	61.5	7	15.4	13	100
8	Amukpe	-	-	2	22.2	1	2	6	66.7	-	-	9	100
9	Eleme	2	20	5	-	-	-	3	30	-	-	10	100
	Isoko-North												
10	Ozoro HQ	2	16.7	7	58.3	-	-	3	25	-	-	12	100
11	Ofagbe	-	-	3	33.3	-	-	5	55.6	1	11.1	9	100
12	Ellu	-	-	2	25	-	-	6	75	-	-	8	100
	Urwie												
13	Effurun HQ	-	-	2	14.3	-	-	10	71.4	2	14.3	14	100
14	Ekpan	-	-	3	37.5	-	-	5	62.5	-	-	8	100
15	Jeddo	-	-	4	50	1	2	3	37.5	-	-	8	100
	Total											158	

Source: Field Survey, 2015

The task of respondents in table 5.3c is to examine the effectiveness or otherwise of the legal/constitutional approach been adopted by the Nigerian State in response to the agitation for Minority rights in the Niger-Delta communities of Delta State. The result revealed that the approach was not effective in most of the selected communities across the state. This does not mean however, that there are no communities where the approach was believed to be effective. Starting with Aniocha South Local Government Area, the use of constitutional/legal measure as a panacea to the agitation was not effective. This was demonstrated by majority of the respondents in all the three selected communities. In OgwashiUku community for instance 75% of the total respondents examine the measure as bad, 16.7% believed that it was even worse. Whereas only 8.3% affirms that the approach was effective. On the whole it is justifiable that the legal/constitutional approach was not effective in OgwashiUku community. In Adonte community of the same Aniocha South Local Government Area 22.2% of the

respondents believe that the approach was effective. However, 44.4% and 33.3% of the respondents are of the view that the approach was bad and worse respectively. This implies that the constitutional legal approach was ineffective in Adonte community.

The result in Ewalu community of the same Local Government indicate negative result as 62.5% of the respondents maintained that the approach was bad, whereas the remaining 37.5% maintained that it was even worse. In summary, the adoption of constitutional/legal approach by the Nigerian State in response to the agitation for Minority rights has proved to be ineffective in Aniocha Local Government Area as demonstrated by majority of respondents across the three sampled communities.

Furthermore, in Warri South Local Government Area of Delta State, the outcome of the survey was not uniform across communities. The result in Warri and Obodo communities revealed that the use of constitutional/legal approach was ineffective, whereas in Gbene-matu community it proves to be effective. For instance in Warri community which is the headquarters of the Local Government, only 28.6% of the respondents rated the use of constitutional/legal approach as effective. However 57.1% and 14.3% saw the approach as bad and worse respectively.

The result in Obodo community was similar as only 27.3% hold the view that the approach was effective. 54.5% believe that the approach was bad, while the remaining 18.2% said it was even worse in terms of effectiveness. This implies that the use of legal/institutional approach was not effective in Obodo community.

However, in Gbene-matu community of the same Warri-South Local Government Area, the outcome was distinct as it indicated that the use of legal/constitutional approach was effective. This was demonstrated by majority of the respondents. 50% of the total respondents believe that the strategy was effective. However 33.3% hold the view that it was ineffective, while the remaining 16.7% did not respond. The implication of the above is that the use of constitutional/legal approach by the Nigerian State was effective in Gbene-matu community of Warri South Local Government Area. Based on the above, it became clear that the use of constitutional/legal framework in the Warri South was not successful all through, as it was success in two communities, Warri and Obodo communities whereas in Gbene-matu community of the same Local Government the approach was a huge success.

In Sapele Local Government Area views of the majority of the respondents' revealed mixed outcome with Sapele and Amukpe on the negative side while Eleme on the positive side. This was confirmed by majority of the respondents in their respective communities. In Sapele community for instance only 25% of the respondent affirms that the approach was effective. However, 61.5% and 15.4% rated the approach as bad and worse respectively. Similarly, in Amukpe community the table revealed that the use of constitutional/legal approach was not effective as only 22.2% of the respondents affirm that the approach was effective. However, 66.7% maintained that approach was ineffective, whereas the remaining 11.1% did not respond on the issue. Therefore, the choice of constitutional/legal approach was not effective in Amukpe community of Sapele Local Government Area of Delta State. In Ellume community, the situation was a bit different as 50% of the respondents affirm that the approach was effective, 20% maintains that the approach was even very effective. However only 30% of the respondents said the approach was bad. Thus it is concluded that the use of constitutional/legal approach was effective in Ellume community of Sapele Local Government Area of Delta State.

The next Local Government Area to examine is the Isoko North where the result also indicate mixed outcome as demonstrated by majority of respondents in these communities. Specifically in Ozoro community, the headquarters of the Local Government Area, 58.3% of the respondents said the approach was effective, 16.7% saw the approach as very effective. Those who saw the approach as bad and ineffective constitute 25%. It is clear therefore that the use of constitutional/legal approach in Ozoro community proved to be effective as supported by the majority of the respondents.

However, the result proved to be ineffective in Ofagbe and Ellu communities both of Isoko North Local Government Area of Delta State. For instance in Ofagbe community 55.6% and 11.1% saw the use of constitutional/legal approach as bad and worse in terms of effectiveness respectively, whereas the remaining 33.3% maintained that it was effective. This implies that the approach was ineffective in Ofagbe community.

Looking at the situation in Ellu community only 25% of the respondents rate, the constitutional approach as effective, whereas 75% of the total respondents which constituted the majority, upholds that it was bad and ineffective. Thus, indicating lack of effectiveness of the constitutional approach in Ellu community of Isoko – North Local Government Area. Furthermore the situation in Urwie Local Government Area shows a mixed result in Effurun community for instance 71.4% and 14.3% saw the approach as bad and worse respectively, whereas the remaining 14.3% did not even respond. This signified that the use of constitutional/legal approach was not effective in Effurun community.

Similarly, the result in Ekpan community of Urwie Local Government Area indicated negative effects, as only 37.5% of the respondents saw the approach as effective. While the remaining 62.5% maintained that it was ineffective. This signifies that the outcome as far as Ekpan community is concerned was negative or ineffective. In Jeddo community, 50% of the respondents said the choice of constitutional/legal approach was effective in their

community, 12.5% did not respond while the remaining 37.5% did saw the approach as bad and ineffective for that matter. From the foregoing, it is clear that the use of constitutional/legal strategy was not effective in Urwie Local Government Area of Delta State.

5.4c: Rating of the Effectiveness of Diversionary tactics/Divide and rule as Nigeria State response to Niger-Delta Instability in Delta State

	Aniocha South	Very Effective		Effective		No response		Bad		Worse		Total	%
		No of rep	%	No of rep	%	No of rep	%	No of rep	%	No of rep	%		
1	OgwashiUku	-	-	3	25	-	-	9	75	-	-	12	100
2	Adonte	-	-	-	-	1	11.1	6	66.7	2	22.2	9	100
3	Ewalu	-	-	2	25	-	-	4	50	2	25	8	100
	Warri South												
4	Wari HQ	-	-	2	14.3	-	-	12	85.7	-	-	14	100
5	Obodo	-	-	5	45.5	2	18.2	3	27.3	1	9.1	11	100
6	Gbene-Matu	-	-	2	16.7	-	-	8	66.7	2	16.7	12	100
	Sapele												
7	Sapele HQ	-	-	3	23.1	-	-	10	76.9	-	-	13	100
8	Amukpe	-	-	2	22.2	-	-	6	66.7	1	11.1	9	100
9	Eleme	-	-	3	30	-	-	5	50	2	20	10	100
	Isoko-North												
10	Ozoro HQ	-	-	6	50	2	16.7	4	33.3	-	-	12	100
11	Ofagbe	-	-	2	22.2	-	-	7	77.8	-	-	9	100
12	Ellu	-	-	1	12.5	-	-	5	62.5	2	25	8	100
	Urwie												
13	Effurun HQ	-	-	3	21.4	-	-	9	64.3	2	14.3	14	100
14	Ekpan	-	-	2	25	1	12.5	5	62.5	-	-	8	100
15	Jeddo	-	-	2	25	-	-	4	50	2	25	8	100
	Total											158	

Source: Field Survey, 2015

In table 5.Above respondents examine the effectiveness or otherwise of the use of Diversionary Tactics/Divide and rule strategy by the Nigerian State to whittle down agitation for Minority rights in the Niger-Delta communities of Delta State.the result indicates that in Aniocha South Local Government Area, the use of such approach proved to be ineffective judging by the rate of responses in that direction. Specifically in Ogwashiuku community of Aniocha South Local Government Area, only 25% of the respondents affirm that the use of divide and rule/diversionary tactics was effective, against the remaining 75% which constituted majority. This implies that the choice of such approach was in effective in OgwashiUku community.

Similarly, in Adonte community of the same Local Government Area, 11.1% of the respondents remained silent on the issue, however, 66.7% and 22.2% maintained that the divide and rule/diversionary approach were even worse respectively. This signifies that such approach was not effective in Adnote community. The outcome was not different in Ewalu community of the same Aniocha South Local Government Area since only 25% of the respondents saw the approach as effective against 50% that hold the view that it was bad and 25% that even rated the approach as worse in terms of effectiveness in whittling the agitation for Minority rights in the community. From the above it is clear that the choice of divide and rule/diversionary tactics as a strategy to undermine the agitation for Minority rights in the Aniocha South Local Government Area of Delta State by the Nigerian State was not effective .

Next is Warri South Local Government Area of Delta State. Here the outcome of the survey is not different from what was found in Aniocha Local Government Area. For instance in Warri headquarter, only 14.3% of the total respondents saw the approach as effective against 85.7% which is the majority indicating that the approach was not effective. However, in Obodo community of the same Local Government Area, the result was distinct as 45.5% of the respondents, which constituted the majority, confirm that the use of diversionary tactics was effective in the community, whereas 27.3% saw it as bad approach, 9.1% said it was even worse in performance, while the remaining 18.2% did not respond on the issue .The outcome in Gbene-matu was similar to the one in Warri community as only 16.7% of the respondents rated the approach as effective, against 66.7% and 16.7% who saw the approach as bad and worse respectively in the area of effectiveness in performance. The implication of the above therefore, is that the choice of diversionary tactics/divide and rule strategy was not successful in Gbene-matu community of Warri South Local Government Area. In summary, while the use of diversionary tactics/divide and rule was confirmed to be effective in Warri and Gbene-matu communities of Warri South Local Government Area, it is clear that it was effective in Obodo community of the same Warri-South Local Government Area of Delta State.

Furthermore, in Sapele Local Government Area of Delta State, it was clear that the use of divide and rule/diversionary tactics as a strategy to undermine the agitation for Minority rights by the Nigerian State was not successful. This was confirmed by the rate of responses in support of this view. Looking at Sapele community for instance only 23.1% of the respondents saw the approach as effective, against the remaining 76.9% who affirms that the approach was ineffective in Sapele community.

In Amukpe community, 22.2% of the respondents opine that the approach was effective, against 66.7% which saw it as bad in terms of effectiveness. This signifies that the choice of divide and rule strategy by the Nigerian State was not effective in Amukpe community of Sapele Local Government Area of Delta State. The outcome from Ellume community was not much different as only 30% of the respondents believe that the approach was effective against 50% and 20% who rates the approach as bad and worse respectively. The implication of the above finding is that the use of divide and rule/ diversionary tactics was not effective in Sapele Local Government Area as confirmed by majority of respondents across the selected communities in the Local Government Area.

The next Local Government is Isoko North Local Government where the outcome happened to be effective in only one community and ineffective in the other two selected communities. Specifically in Ozoro community which is the headquarters of the Local Government Area it is clear that the approach was effective as demonstrated by 50% of the respondents in support of this. 16.7% however, did not respond on the issue, whereas the remaining 33.3% said the approach was bad. However in Ofagbe and Ellu communities of Isoko North Local Government Area the use of divide and rule/diversionary approach was not effective as demonstrated by majority of the respondents. Specifically, in Ofagbe community, only 22.2% of the respondent saw the approach as effective against the remaining 77.8% that maintained that it was bad. Similarly, in Ellu community only 12.5% saw the approach as effective, remaining 62.5% said it was even worse approach in terms of effectiveness in performance.

Moreover, the outcome of the survey in Urwie Local Government Area indicates negative result as demonstrated by majority of the respondent across the various communities in the Local Government Area. For instance, in Effurun community which is the headquarters of the Local Government Area, 64.3% and 14.3% of the respondents saw the use of the divide and rule approach as bad and worse respectively in terms of performance, however only 21.4% maintains that it was effective strategy implying lack of effectiveness of the strategy. In Ekpan community of the same Local Government Area the situation was not different as only 25% of the respondents opine that the approach was effective. 12.5% did not respond on the issue where as 62.5% which constituted the majority maintained that it was ineffective approach. This implies poor performance by the approach in Ekpan community. In Jeddo community of the same Urwie Local Government Area, only 25% of the respondents saw the approach as effective, 50% said it was bad while the remaining 25% affirms that it is even worse in terms of performance. This signifies that the approach was ineffective in Jeddo community.

In summary, the result indicate that the use of divide and rule/diversionary tactics was not effective in Urwie Local Government Area .from the foregoing presentation and analysis it is clear that the use of divide and rule/diversionary tactics as a strategy to undermine the agitation for Minority rights in the Niger-Delta communities of Delta State has resulted to different opinion and interpretation among respondents across the selected communities in the state. While majority of the respondents saw the approach as ineffective in terms of performance, there are stall pockets of communities that maintained that although the ploy was not comfortable to the residents but its adoption by the Nigerian State was not without success.

V. NATURE OF NIGERIA STATE RESPONSE TO NIGER-DELTA INSTABILITY

This section dwelt on the nature of Nigerian state response to the Niger-Delta instability in general.

5.2.1 The Instruments of Force/Threats or of Violence

It is axiomatic to state that repression had been a conventional approach used by modern states in resolving its internal conflict especially as it relate to the intergovernmental fiscal relations. For instance, the common trend shared by the government under both civil and authoritarian administration in post-colonial Nigeria state especially in whittling down the voice of opposition like the agitation for resource control by the Niger-Delta minorities is the use of instrument of violence or threats of force. The first attempt by the Nigerian post-colonial state to use repression as a counter insurgency measure against its citizens is rooted in the clamp down on the AdakaBoro 12 day revolution on the 23rd February 1966 (Mier, 2000). AdakaBoro proclaimed the Niger-Delta republic with himself as the Head of State. The AdakaBoro irredentist Niger-Delta volunteer force numbered over 160 thousand men engaged and defeated the Nigeria police in a bloody battle but was defeated on the 12th day by the Nigerian armed forces. The central theme of the Boro's agitation then was resource control.

Similarly, in 1995 the Ogoni environmental activist ken Saro-Wiwa mobilized the Ogoni youth to lunch mass and often violent protest against the activities of shell in Ogoni land. This development was considered by the military government under General SaniAbacha not only as an economic sabotage, bearing in mind its

implication for oil production, but as having grave security implication for the corporate existence of the Nigeria State

Therefore, fearful of the consequences that the Ogoni's continued protest might have on the oil production and its revenue base power' the Nigerian state fore-closed any possibility of peaceful settlement and consequently decided to clamp down on the Ogoni's using state instrument of force, to pacify the Ogoni situation which appeared horrendous. Consequently, the Ogoni crisis was laid to rest and Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni right activists were hanged in a broad day light despite global clamour for clemency. It has been stated from the very onset that the use of repression as a strategy to whittle down protest against the state by the citizenry is not limited to the military authoritarian regimes but also exercised by civil administrations. Thus, the government of Olusegun Obasanjo had ordered the military actions against the civilian population in the town of Odi in revenge to the killing of 13 military personnel. This resulted in the destruction of Odi with much civilian causality both killed and injured. In addition, properties worth millions of naira were destroyed. Similarly a lot of civilians were maimed, women raped and communities displaced.

Furthermore, the administration of Goodluck Jonathan had also declared a full scale war on the coastal area of the oil producing regions of Nigeria in which a large number of women, children and other civilians were not only displaced but lost their lives. The impression of the above scene is that oil is more precious than human blood to the Nigerian leaders.

Ojo (2006:311) has summarized the rationale behind the excessive use of force by the Nigeria state to quell down the protesters as *Convergence of interests in the politics of the control of oil resource and the survival of Nigeria because of the mono-culture-nature of the economy*.

This position was amply supported by Ikelegbe who states clearly that "given the very high stake of oil it make the state to be sluggish on dialogue, negotiation or concession but expansive in terms of repressive response". This culture of use of state instrument of coercion by the Nigerian state to pacify the youth a strategy that never paid off is seen by many observers as a continuation of Pax Britannica in the area to harass and intimidate the people to submission by possible wiping out communities as epitomized by Odi Massacre under the Obasanjo democratic regime.

Be that as it may, it is imperative to state that the use of instrument of force against the citizenry by the Nigeria security forces is not limited to the oil bearing communities but common trend and manifest character of the Nigeria leaders as this approach had also found expression in Zaki Biam in Benue State (2004) where the whole community was ransacked by the Nigeria military as well as in the city of Maiduguri during the Boko Haram insurgency.

5.2.2 The Legalistic Constitutional Approach

The Nigerian state had also responded to the politics of oil and agitation for resource control by the Niger-Delta minority ethnic groups through legal or constitutional measures. The fundamental of all these is the introduction of the 1969 Petroleum Act which vested the ownership of all oil deposit in the Nigeria post-colonial state.

Similarly the power to grant oil exploitation license (OEL) is vested in the office of the minister of petroleum resources. This by implication resulted in the state having power to appropriate all land in the oil producing areas under the guise of public interest and claim to the oil wealth. The introduction of 1979 Land Use Act which bestowed the right of ownership of land in the hands of the state had further redefined the position of land ownership in Nigeria, of particular interest is the section 28 of the Acts which stipulates that the state governor could revoke a right of occupancy, for the purpose of public interest, which includes requirement of land for mining purpose or oil pipeline or for any purpose connected there with.

Furthermore, the Nigerian state had also attempted to whittle down the tempo of agitation for resources control through the provision of section 162(2) of the 1999 constitution which gave back the not less than 13% of the monies generated from all resources to the various state governments in the oil producing areas. This does not only mean to generate sympathy from the people but due to the ferociousness with which the youth in the Niger-Delta were advancing their cause.

The introduction of the on-shore-off shore dichotomy via the provision and pronouncement of section 162(2) of the 1999 constitution by the supreme court which limited the seaward boundary of the littoral state for the purpose of calculating the amount of revenue accruing to the federation account from any natural resources to the low water mark of the land surface, therefore the collective implication of the legally induced constraint introduced by the post-colonial state is to reduce the over bearing influence of the oil producing state on the control of resource found within their region and by extension increase the grip of the Nigeria state on the oil deposit and its power base (Dlakwa, 2006; Ibeanu and Luckham, 2007).

Let it be made clear that the legalistic and constitutional measures adopted by the Nigeria state also had some noble intention of genuinely responding to the collective aspiration for development of the Niger-Delta community; for instance the successful passage of the local content bill into law and the granting of 25% equity

share in the oil to the oil producing states is a success story and an indication of government's genuine desire to address the Niger-Delta development challenges. It is expected therefore, that the people of Niger-Delta should show positive response to this government gesture.

5.2.3 Diversionary Approach

Other strategy adopted by the Nigerian State to whittle down the effects of the agitation for resource control is the divide and rule policy through tacit support of one ethnic group against others. For instance, there was deliberate attempt by the federal government to give preferential treatment in the provision of essential services and location of local government headquarters in the area perceived as supporters of government at the detriment of its perceived opposition.

A classic example is the case between the Ijaws and Itsekiri in the location and relocation of local government in Delta state which resulted into ethnic violence among the two groups; the essence of this is a diversionary tactics by the government to divert the attention of the people from the exploitative tendency of the government and multinational oil companies (Ojo 2005:311).

Similarly, the Nigeria state adopted the strategy of cooperation and payment of money to selected community leaders. The intension behind this action is to create a crack among the rank of the people and weaken their support base; a clear point of reference is the government generated skirmish among leaders of Ogoni communities which led to factionalization of the group between Ken SaroWiwa and LadunMetton (Mier, 2000).

5.2.4 Institutional Response

The Nigeria state also adopted several institutional strategies to resolve the Niger-Delta crisis arising from politics of oil and agitation for Minority rights since independence, thus successive governments have in individuals and collective capacity put different institutional measures to overcome or face the challenges of the Niger-Delta crisis. For instance, on the attendance independence, the government of Sir AbubakarTafawaBalewa had declared the Niger-Delta area as a special area to be developed directly by the federal government, leading to the establishment of the Niger-Delta development board in 1960. These boards have no doubt made a tremendous land mark in the development area despite the challenges of insufficient fund. The activities of the board were however truncated by the bloody civil war of 1967 – 1970 (Mier, 2000; Ojo, 2006).

At the end of the civil war, the Gowon administration embarked on the programme of reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction which is not limited to the Niger-Delta area but cut across all Nigeria regions, as such there was no specific allocation set aside for the development of the Niger-Delta area. Similarly by 1992 the federal military government under General Ibrahim Babangida established the oil mineral producing area development commission (OMPADEC). The mandate of the commission is to administer the special fund set aside for the development of the Niger-Delta area. This move by Babangida was generally seen by observers as a genuine desire to develop the neglected oil producing areas of the Niger-Delta through the use of some quota of the production for the provision of basic infrastructure and capacity building through provision of employment, project distribution and construction. It must be acknowledged that the federal government by ways of commission has expended billions of naira in the oil producing communities for development, which makes some observers to applaud the government initiative as a reflection of magnanimous and godly spirit in sympathizing with the circumstances of the poverty stricken oil producing communities (Suberu 1999:37, Ugoh and Ukpere 2010).

However, like other institutional framework introduced the OMPADEC has left much to be desired as it suffered some operational setback arising from its neglect to share contract and employment. In additions, the commission embarked on frivolous spending which amounted to the tune of billions of naira on uncompleted white elephant projects most of which have no direct bearing on the socio-economic needs of the people. On this note therefore, it is stating the obvious that developmental challenges confronting the oil producing communities of the Niger-Delta is not squarely a failure of government, but those who handled the project (Ojo, 2005).

The advent of chief Obasanjo's government in 1999 saw a dramatic departure from the Babangida's line of thinking as the OMPADEC was replaced with the Niger-Delta development commission (NDDC), in 2000, with similar but slightly different mandate considering the historical antecedent of the region. This move was seen as a positive development except that the outcome of the activities of the commission were far from the expectation of the people of the region as their yearning especially the provision of the basic infrastructure remained elusive.

This programme failure were mostly attributed to inherent contradiction such as inadequate representation of various oil producing communities on the board, and the involvement of the members of the non-oil producing areas in the commission. The perception of the oil bearing areas is that while their communities are being starved of projects expected to alleviate their sufferings from poverty, person from non-oil producing areas are becoming richer and live in affluence. Thus, no matter the efforts made by the NDDC to reach the oil

producing communities with project and programmes that will up lift their standard of living cannot be expedient because of the people mindset that that NDDC was based on exploitation and oppression.

It could be deduced from the above therefore, that the crisis of the Niger-Delta is not only a product of the mindset but expectation as such, no matter how genuine is the intent and effort put by institutions like NDDC it will not succeed. This is because the people of Niger Delta already have a fixated mind that the palliative institution such as NDDC is based on exploitation and oppression. Worse still the people of the oil producing area are of the view that the federal government is unleashing arrogant treatment and deprivation on them because of its believe that they are not only disinherited but expendable people, it is these injustices and exploitation that led to the emergence of ethnic-based militia such as the Movement for the survival of the Ogoni People (MOSSOP), the Association of Mineral Producing Areas of River state (AMPARS) and the Association of Oil Producing Minorities (AOPM) among others (Mier, 2000; Ibeanu and Luckham, 2007).

It is quite impressive to note that with the successful transition of power from Chief OlusegunObasanjo to late Umar Yar'adua, the Yar'adua's government came up with the seven point agenda, one of which was the provision of peace, security and stability in the Niger-Delta area. In order to realize this, the president established a ministry of Niger delta. The ministry was mandated among other things to formulate and coordinate policies for rapid socioeconomic development and security of the Niger delta region.

In addition, the government has proclaimed amnesty for the militant and urged them to surrender all illegal arms in their possession unconditionally within 60 days starting from 5th of May 2009 to October 6, 2009.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

From the foregoing presentation and analysis the following Conclusions became eminent

1. That oil has become central and sources of conflict in global political economy i.e. wars among countries and with oil producing communities. That the mismanagement of oil resources in Nigeria has resulted in poor state of development and increase in the propensity of poverty among Nigerians especially among oil producing communities in the Niger delta which resulted in agitation both convulsive and violent. This compelled the Nigeria state to respond through different measures including; Use of violence/threats of violence, legalistic approach, Institutional response and above all dived and rule.
2. That the strategies adopted by the Nigerian state have yielded mixed effects both positive and negative across different communities. However of all these strategies the most outstanding and conspicuous is the institutional responses such as the establishment of Oil Minerals producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC), the Niger delta Development commission(NDDC), the creation of ministry of Niger delta and the introduction of Amnesty programme for the repentant militants including vocational training and payment of stipends, but as Nobel and lofty this idea is its capacity is limited by paucity of funds, pervasive , corruption official sleaze and the lack of commitment and will power on the side of the management of these institutions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the forgoing the paper recommends among other things:

That the federal government through the Niger delta Development commission (NDDC) and the ministry of Niger delta should sustain the amnesty programme especially the *vocational* training aspect of it. This can be achieved through adequate and timely release of funds and proper supervision mechanism to check corruption.

There is need for the federal government to improve funding for both the Niger delta Development commission (NDDC), and the ministry of Niger delta to enable them complete the on-going development projects in the area with the view of filling in the developmental gaps and needs of the area.

There is also need for the diversification of the economy especially in the area of agriculture and solid minerals. The federal government should go beyond the traditional rhetoric and swing into action.

The federal government of Nigeria through the NNPC should intensify more efforts in the search for oils in the Chad Basin, Sokotoand Benue trough oil basins to reduce the contestation for resource control by the oil bearing communities in the Niger delta.

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